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 The question I wish to address in this paper is the following. Does the 
opposition which the early Indian tradition itself introduces by distinguishing Aryans 
from non-Aryans help us to understand later developments of Indian culture? Put more 
generally: Do we have to assume any kind of opposition in order to understand some of 
the later developments, whether or not the parties concerned referred to themselves as 
Aryans? I will limit the discussion of this question to a few examples, representing the 
views of some chosen scholars. 
 In the study of Vedic culture, and more in particular that of the Vedic sacrifice, 
non-Vedic influences have occasionally been claimed by modern researchers. I mention 
here the use of bricks in the Agnicayana, which Hyla Stuntz Converse (1974) tried to 
explain through the assumption of indigenous influence on Vedic ritual. Another 
example is the Mahåv¥ra vessel in the Pravargya, which J.A.B. van Buitenen (1968: 23 
f.) considered to have an iconic nature, and the worship of which he did not hesitate to 
describe as pËjå.1 Converse (1974: 85) believed, moreover, that the inverted firing 
technique used to make the Mahåv¥ra vessel betrays the influence of indigenous non-
Vedic culture. Van Buitenen cautions against the use of ‘non-Aryan’, calling it "rather 
loose". He prefers to speak of ‘non-Vedic’, or perhaps ‘non-Brahmanistic’, but more 
precisely ‘non-ßrotriya’. His essential point is however clear: The kind of worship found 
in connection with the Mahåv¥ra figure has no parallels in other Vedic sacrifices. The 
only way to understand it is to assume that it is due to non-Vedic influence. Hiding 
behind this explanation is the assumption of a fundamental opposition within society of 
the time concerned. This opposition, it is claimed, allows us to understand this 
particular feature of the Pravargya ritual. 
 Both these cases, and especially the one proposed by Converse, have 
subsequently been acclaimed by some,2 and criticized by others.3 This is not the place 
                                                
1 Falk (1994: 322 f.) discusses some Vedic and early post-Vedic passages that refer to statues. 
2 See Staal, 1978; 1983: I: 130 f.; 1990: 61; forthcoming; Thapar, 1983: 18 f.; Parpola, 1983: 47, 57; 
1994: 154, 169, 201, 221; see also Bandhari, 1981. Gonda (1979: xv) describes van Buitenen's attempt to 
show that the Pravargya contains elements of non-brahmanic origin as being "not without success". 
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to take sides with regard to their positions. The main thing for us is to observe that the 
scholars concerned try to explain what they consider an irregular feature in the material 
they study with the help of a historical development. [34] If something does not fit in its 
context, it is because it has been borrowed from another context where it did. Since 
there is, in these cases, little or no direct evidence concerning that other context, nor 
about the presumed fact that the feature concerned has been borrowed, these historical 
reconstructions are bound to be speculative. This does not however invalidate the 
general principle. I do believe that an historical explanation of a feature that does not fit 
its present context may often be appropriate. I just want to emphasize that in practice it 
may be encumbered by many uncertainties. When can we say that a feature does not fit 
the context in which we find it? How can we be sure that it must originally have fitted 
its context? Is it conceivable that certain features of Vedic sacrifices, or of other cultural 
entities, have never fitted in any context? 
 Of course, there are more direct indications that middle Vedic literature was 
acquainted with a non-Vedic population. It has repeatedly been suggested that the 
Asuras, the eternal enemies of the gods, were somehow linked with the non-Vedic 
population. I doubt whether such a link can be generally postulated. In some cases it 
does however seem to hold.4 One of these is the famous passage of the Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa (3.2.1.23) where the Asuras are stated to exclaim in barbarous language he 
'lavo he 'lava˙. Paul Thieme (1938: 4 (10)) has argued that this stands for Mågadh¥ he 
'layo he 'laya˙ (so cited by the grammarian Patañjali), corresponding to Sanskrit he 
'rayo he 'raya˙ "hail friends!". David Carpenter (1994: 30) is tempted to conclude from 
this and other evidence that later Vedic society is to be viewed "as a hybrid culture 
forged out of Indo-Aryan and indigenous ... elements under the aegis of the cultural 
norm represented by the sacrifice and its language". F.R. Allchin remarks similarly, on 
the basis of archaeological and literary evidence (1995: 331): "The period must have 
witnessed the further development of a multi-ethnic society in which Indo-Aryans or 
their descendants, and self-styled Indo-Aryans of various origins, formed elite groups, 
claiming dominance and power over a mixed population of whom an increasing 
proportion were what we referred to as ‘acculturated Aryans’, that is to say descendants 
of the earlier population of any region who had acquired Indo-Aryan speech and 
perhaps other traits." The question to be asked is, of course, to what extent the non-
Vedic elements (I would hesitate to use the term "indigenous" here) were integrated in 
this society, and to what extent they were, at that time, ready to accept the cultural norm 
represented by the sacrifice and its language. 
                                                                                                                                         
3 See Kashikar, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1982; Rau, 1972: 72. 
4 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: 69 f. 
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 I will now turn to another problem, one which has interested scholars for a long 
time. In late Vedic literature certain new ideas make their appearance, which are absent 
(or at any rate not clearly present) in earlier Vedic literature, and which form the 
backbone of much of later Indian thought. These same ideas are strongly present in, and 
determine to some extent, a number of new religious movements which make their 
appearance in about the same period or soon after. I am, of course, speaking of the 
belief in reincarnation [35] and in the role of actions therein; or in good English: about 
the doctrine of karma. The question I wish to raise is: Is there reason to assume behind 
these particular innovations an opposition between different communities of people? Or 
is there no need for such an assumption? 
 The question is hardly original, and it is impossible to discuss all the answers 
that have been proposed to it. I will confine myself to discussing the opinions of some 
few scholars which have been, and still are, particularly influential. 
 The French sociologist Louis Dumont, to begin with, speaks of a fundamental 
opposition between the renouncer and the man in the world.5 He presents this 
opposition as characterizing Indian society throughout most of its history, and as being 
responsible for all its innovations. In reality it is the late Vedic period and the 
beginnings of Buddhism and Jainism which he thinks about in the first place. Since this 
is not generally realized, we have to pay some attention to his words. 
 The renouncer, according to Dumont, has played a major role in a great number 
of religious and other innovations in India. This is how he describes that role (1982: 94-
95): 
 
For more than two millennia Indian society has been characterised by two 
complementary features: society imposes upon every person a tight 
interdependence which substitutes constraining relationship for the individual as 
we know him, but, on the other hand, there is the institution of world-
renunciation which allows for the full independence of the man who chooses it. 
Incidentally, this man, the renouncer, is responsible for all the innovations in 
religion that India has seen. Moreover, we see clearly in early texts the origin of 
the institution, and we understand it easily: the man who is after ultimate truth 
forgoes social life and its constraints to devote himself to his own progress and 
destiny. When he looks back at the social world, he sees it from a distance, as 
something devoid of reality, and the discovery of the self is for him coterminous, 
not with salvation in the Christian sense, but with liberation from the fetters of 
                                                
5 The following remarks draw heavily upon an article "Louis Dumont et les renonçants indiens" which 
will appear in Orientalia Suecana. 
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life as commonly experienced in this world. The renouncer is self-sufficient, 
concerned only with himself. His thought is similar to that of the modern 
individual, but for one basic difference: we live in the social world, he lives 
outside it. ... The renouncer may live in solitude as a hermit or may join a group 
of fellow-renouncers under a master-renouncer, who propounds a particular 
discipline of liberation. 
 
 This passage is but a brief restatement of an earlier article called "World 
renunciation in Indian religions", published in French in 1959 and in English in 1960. 
 Note to begin with that Dumont's theory does not claim to be an exact 
description of the present situation in India. Dumont characterizes his theory as trying 
"to show that it is useful to distinguish two ‘ideal types’, which in fact combine more 
and more in the course of time" (1960: 47). Dumont's lack of appreciation for present-
day ascetics in India is clear from [36] a passage in his booklet La civilisation indienne 
et nous. Here he says:6 "Que de nos jours on soit souvent conduit à se faire une assez 
piètre idée de la masse des renonçants contemporains, mendiants, yogis ou sadhus, ne 
change rien au fait que c'est dans cette condition que la pensée indienne a trouvé les 
racines de sa vie." 
 Dumont's theory therefore primarily concerns the past, more precisely the rather 
remote past. It is not based on contemporary observation, but on philology. Dumont 
says so himself, where he describes his theory as an attempt "to bring together from a 
sociological vantage point the main findings of Indology" (1960: 37). It is true that he 
claims on the same page that "the direct study of a small Hindu group led me to abstract 
certain principles which, it then appeared, could be more widely applied". But his main 
attention was focused on the past. It is even possible to be precise with regard to the 
period about which he thinks in the first place; he speaks "of that extraordinary post-
vedic and pre-hindu development which goes on from the first Upanishads to the 
Bhagavadgita, the golden age of speculation in which emerge, from discovery to 
discovery, the dominant tendencies of Hindu thought" (1960: 49). It seems indeed that 
the theory of Dumont covers first of all the centuries which precede our era. 
 This impression is confirmed by what Dumont says about bhakti: love, or total 
devotion to the Lord. He considers this, as distinct from Tantrism, a sanyasic 
development, an invention of the renouncer: "This religion of love supposes two 
perfectly individualized terms; in order to conceive of a personal Lord there must also 
be a believer who sees himself as an individual" (1960: 57). On the next page Dumont 
                                                
6 Dumont, 1975: 33. "The fact that nowadays one often gets a miserable impression of the mass of 
contemporary renouncers, beggars, yogis or sadhus, doesn't change the circumstance that Indian thought 
has found the roots of its existence in this condition." 
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continues: "The central point is that, thanks to love, renunciation is transcended by 
being internalized; in order to escape the determinism of actions, inactivity is no longer 
necessary, detachment and disinterestedness are sufficient: one can leave the world 
from within, and God himself is not bound by his acts, for he only acts out of love. ... 
By transferring his conquests from the plane of knowledge to that of affectivity, the 
renouncer makes a gift of them to everybody: by loving submission, by identifying 
themselves unreservedly with the Lord, everybody can become free individuals." (1960: 
58). In other words, at least since the Bhagavadg¥tå there are individuals in Indian 
society itself, who are not renouncers. And their number must be considerable, for the 
Bhagavadg¥tå has exercised an enormous influence on Hinduism. Since the 
Bhagavadg¥tå dates from the beginning of our era or from even earlier, one must 
conclude that from that moment onward India has had a large number of individuals 
who were not renouncers, but lived in society. If, then, we look for the period [37] 
during which the theory of Dumont might have been applicable, we arrive at the 
centuries preceding the beginning of our era.7 
 Dumont's remarks about Tantrism — another religious development which 
becomes manifest after the beginning of our era — agree with this. He describes 
Tantrism as a large branch of Hinduism which presents us with the rejection of ascetic 
renunciation (1960: 52), or as "a truly fundamental variant of Hinduism, in which 
renunciation is replaced by reversal" (1960: 56). Tantrism constitutes therefore a 
religious innovation in India, which has not been created or invented by renouncers. 
This is possible, because Tantrism does not belong to the period preceding our era, 
which appears to interest Dumont more than any other period. 
 With regard to modern India, Dumont accepts the presence of individuals in 
society. He explains this as the result of a mixture of two mentalities, accentuated 
perhaps by European influence, but primarily due to the influence of the renouncer who 
often, as spiritual master (guru), has followers in society. One must, Dumont thinks, 
distinguish analytically these two mentalities, for logical, historical and comparative 
reasons. Only in this way can we, with the help of simple principles in an otherwise 
indecipherable whole, situate the society, the thought and, to some extent, the history of 
India with regard to ourselves.8 We may conclude that Dumont's theory is, for the 
                                                
7 For an evalutation of the degree of individuality taught by the Bhagavadg¥tå, see Bronkhorst, 0000. It 
hardly corresponds to the ideas mentioned by Dumont, for which he used such expressions as "vraiment 
indépendants", "capables d'introduire des innovations religieuses", etc. 
8 Dumont, 1975: 56-57: "Il faut ... répondre à une objection que la grande majorité des Hindous instruits 
ne manquent pas d'exprimer contre la distinction que j'ai proposée des deux mentalités. Pour eux, et fort 
légitimement, le désir de la délivrance (mok∑a) n'est pas incompatible avec la vie dans le monde - et en 
effet on la trouve de bonne heure associée à la triade des fins proprement mondaines: le devoir religieux, 
le profit économico-politique, et le plaisir immédiat. Ou encore ils se sentent comme des individus, 
reconnaissent une morale universelle et pensent qu'il y a à l'intérieur de l'hindouisme une moralité 
subjective. On répondra simplement que cela résulte du mélange de deux mentalités, accentué peut-être 
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present situation, at best an analytical instrument; it does not at all claim to be a correct 
description of it. 
 But even at the period before our era, at least certain renouncers (in the sense of 
Dumont) were hardly free from restricting relationships and completely independent. 
We are particularly well informed about the daily life of Buddhist monks at that period, 
and we know that they lived under very [38] elaborate rules.9 The different Buddhist 
schools preserved each their own (massive) collection of monastic rules with so much 
diligence, that the earliest schisms in the Buddhist church seem all of them to have been 
the results of differences concerning the form or interpretation of these rules.10 It would 
seem, therefore, that even in that remote past, the theory of Dumont is at best applicable 
to a small part of the renouncers. 
 To resume. Dumont's theory applies primarily (or even exclusively) to the 
ancient period, say the centuries preceding the beginning of our era. It is, moreover, 
based on the philological analysis of ancient documents,11 rather than on the 
sociological study of Indian society. We are therefore entitled to ask: Does Dumont's 
theory satisfactorily explain the situation depicted in the early texts? Were the great 
religious discoveries he talks about — and Dumont thinks no doubt of the new ideas 
expressed in the Upani∑ads, of the origin of Buddhism and Jainism, etc. — enunciated 
by renouncers? And if yes, is it the fact that they were renouncers that allowed them to 
make these discoveries? Dumont's theory is by no means self-evident. Even if we were 
to assume that all original thinkers in ancient India were renouncers, is it not 
conceivable that they became renouncers because of their new ideas, and not vice-
versa? Could it not be that there were other, non-Vedic, segments of the population 
where different ideas held sway, ideas which induced some of their members to choose 
the life of a renouncer? The existence at that period of such segments of the population 
might be obscured by the fact that they had no literature, or that their literature has not 
been preserved. This very possibility takes us, of course, back to the question of Aryan 
and non-Aryan. 
                                                                                                                                         
par l'influence européenne, mais dû en premier lieu à l'influence du renonçant qui souvent, comme maître 
spirituel (guru), a fait des adeptes dans la société. Ces deux mentalités, il faut bien les distinguer 
analytiquement pour des raisons logiques, historiques et comparatives. C'est seulement en procédant de la 
sorte que nous pouvons, en dégageant des principe simples d'un ensemble autrement indéchiffrable, situer 
la société, la pensée et, dans une certaine mesure déjà, l'histoire de l'Inde par rapport à nous." 
9 Dumont refers at several occasions to Buddhist monks, and includes them explicitly in the category of 
renouncers. Cp. Dumont, 1960: 44 n. 18: "... I have generalized the Brahmanic idea and have called 
renouncers, or even sanyasis, all those who have left the world in a manner analogous to that of the 
orthodox sanyasi including, for example, Buddhist monks." Tambiah (1982: 300) thinks that Dumont's 
article concerns first of all Buddhist monks; he describes in detail the rules to which they have to submit. 
10 This point of view, first presented by Heinz Bechert in 1961, has recently been criticized by Shizuka 
Sasaki in a series of articles (1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). 
11 One suspects also the presence of a strong dose of "what Said calls ‘Romantic Orientalism’, with its 
fantasies of lost wisdom, ... and its degradation of the Oriental modern" (Lopez, 1995: 12). 
IS THERE AN INNER CONFLICT OF TRADITION 7 
 
 
 First, however, we must briefly consider another possibility. Dumont offered the 
idea that certain individuals, for one reason or another, became renouncers, as a result 
of which they introduced new ideas and innovations into Indian thought and religion. 
He does not specify which segments of the population provided these renouncers, and 
we must assume that they came from various segments, perhaps including what we may 
call the Vedic population. The origin of these renouncers does not seem to matter all 
that much to Dumont, for the new ideas they produced have for him more to do with 
their state as renouncer than with the particular segment of the population which they 
left in order to become renouncers. One might however assume [39] the opposite. One 
might maintain that the Vedic tradition in particular developed in such a way that its 
adherents came to accept, or even invent, the karma theory, and were induced to 
become renouncers. This is the position of J.C. Heesterman, who articulates this point 
of view primarily in an article that was reprinted in a volume called The Inner Conflict 
of Tradition (1985). Heesterman, too, believes that a conflict is to be assumed to explain 
these and other developments in India. But contrary to Dumont and others, his conflict 
is a real "inner conflict". That is to say, it is not the expression of different groups in 
society which oppose and influence each other, but rather something inherent in single 
traditions, which stays with these traditions, and cannot be, or is in any case not 
normally, resolved. The introduction to the book just mentioned states this quite 
generally (p. 2): "Tradition is characterized by the inner conflict of atemporal order and 
temporal shift rather than by resilience and adaptiveness. It is this unresolved conflict 
that provides the motive force we perceive as the flexibility of tradition. Indian 
civilization offers a particularly clear case of this dynamic inner conflict." Note that 
these remarks apply to tradition in general, not only to Indian tradition, and even less to 
only one episode of Indian tradition. The conflict, moreover, is between "atemporal 
order and temporal shift", positions which can no doubt not be completely identified 
with different groups in society. 
 Let us now turn to Heesterman's article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer", which 
is chapter two of his book The Inner Conflict of Tradition, mentioned earlier. 
Heesterman derives the Upani∑adic karma doctrine from certain postulated 
developments in the Vedic sacrifice (p. 34 f.). The interiorization of the ritual, 
moreover, is presented as the logical conclusion of its ongoing individualization (p. 38 
f.). And here we touch the principle of world renunciation, the emergence of which, 
Heesterman maintains, has been of crucial importance in the development of Indian 
religious thinking. To substantiate this claim, which he does not further elaborate, 
Heesterman refers without comments in a note to Dumont's article "World renunciation 
in Indian religions", which we have discussed above. It would seem that Heesterman 
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agrees with Dumont's thesis to the extent that renouncers have been responsible for 
most of the discoveries and innovations in Indian religious life. He disagrees, however, 
with respect to the Brahmin, whom Dumont views as the opposite of the renouncer, 
while Heesterman puts him on a par with the renouncer.12 
 Renunciation, in Heesterman's opinion, can be understood as a development of 
Vedic thought. He expresses this in the following passage, which is worth quoting in 
full (p. 39-40): 
 
It is often thought that the institution of renunciation emerged as a protest 
against brahminical orthodoxy or that it originated in non-brahmanical or even 
non-Aryan circles. The theory of the four åßramas, or stages of life, would then 
have been an attempt at legitimizing the renunciatory modes of life and drawing 
them within the orbit of brahminical orthodoxy. There is of course full scope for 
recognizing the influence of [40] extraneous beliefs and practices, for instance, 
in the matter of various forms of asceticism. But the important point is that these 
influences do not seem to have made a decisive irruption in the development of 
religious thought. They seem rather to have fitted themselves into the 
orthogenetic, internal development of Vedic thought. Or one might say that 
these extraneous beliefs and practices were not in principle dissimilar from those 
that obtained among the adherents of the preclassical ritual. 
 
While elaborating this last remark, Heesterman draws attention to various renunciant 
features in Vedic rites and life, and comes to the conclusion that the institution of 
renunciation is already implied in classical ritual thinking. The difference between 
classical ritualism and renunciation, he continues, seems to be a matter rather of degree 
than of principle (p. 41). 
 The upshot of all this is, that the important religious developments of the 
centuries preceding the common era are, here too, caused by an opposition, by conflict. 
This conflict is however, for Heesterman, an inner conflict of the Vedic tradition, not a 
conflict between different opposed groups of people. Indeed, Heesterman concludes his 
article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer" with the following remark (p. 44): "The 
brahmin, then, is the exemplar of the irresolvable tension that is at the heart of Indian 
civilization." 
 
 Dumont explained the main religious developments in ancient India with the 
help of an opposition between two groups of people: the renouncer as against the man 
                                                
12 Heesterman, 1985: 231-32 n.32. 
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in the world. Heesterman postulated a similar opposition, but one present in one single 
group, or even in single individuals. If one goes along with these two scholars in 
thinking that an opposition, or oppositions, lie behind the major changes that become 
visible in Indian religion in the centuries preceding the common era, one has to take 
into consideration a third possibility: the opposition, or oppositions, may have been 
embodied in physically distinct groups of people. We have seen that similar hypotheses 
have been proposed to account for certain features of the Agnicayana and Pravargya 
rituals. But whereas in the case of these sacrifices the evidence was only indirect, we 
will see that there is far more explicit evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
religious upheavals of the late-Vedic period had something to do with the non-Vedic 
population. Dumont and Heesterman may have overlooked this, partly because they 
worked with too simplistic ideas of renunciation, of liberation, and of the link between 
these two.13 
[41] 
 Perhaps it is the sociological orientation of these two scholars which leads them 
to identify the aim of renunciation with "liberation from the fetters of life as commonly 
experienced in this world", as Dumont puts it; Heesterman describes the renouncer as 
"emancipated from the relations which govern [the world]" (p. 39). Descriptions like 
these tend to make one overlook the aims which the early texts ascribe to the 
renouncers. It turns out that not all renouncers pursue the same aim. What is more, the 
English term ‘renouncer’ is not the translation of any one single Sanskrit term. There 
are, on the contrary, a number of Sanskrit terms which are not treated as synonyms in 
the texts. As so often, the urge to translate Indian expressions into expressions which 
are meaningful to the modern investigator, is here responsible for a failure to 
understand the texts on their own terms. 
 It turns out that early post-Vedic literature knows, and acknowledges, two 
altogether different spiritual aims, which cannot both be heaped together under the 
heading ‘liberation’. Some ascetics aspire for heaven (svarga), others seek to obtain 
final liberation (mok∑a; apavarga; apunarbhava). The two are occasionally explicitly 
                                                
13 An interesting criticism of the orthogenetic point of view is to be found in Brian K. Smith's 
Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion. Consider his following observations (1989: 195): 
"Perhaps the case for a certain discontinuity, for the Upanishads as emblematic not of an extension of 
Vedic ritualism but of its demise as the dominant worldview of ancient India, can be made on the basis of 
my work here. I have located the heart and soul of Vedic ritualism in a principle at odds with that 
underlying monism. In the Upanishads, one might be witnessing the conclusion of Vedism not in the 
sense of its culmination but in the sense of its destruction. In the proto-Vedåntic view, the universe and 
ritual order based on resemblance has collapsed, and a very different configuration based on identity 
(abhorred by the Vedic ritualists as the ‘excess of resemblance’, jåmi) has emerged. Upanishadic 
monism, one might say, blew the lid off a system contained, as well as regulated, by hierarchical 
resemblance." Also p. 210: "The Upanishadic redefinition of the ‘true sacrifice’ might be best seen not as 
the logical outcome of Vedic ritual thinking but rather as a valuable objet trouvé useful to assimilate the 
foreign to the traditional." 
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contrasted. In Aßvagho∑a's Buddhacarita, for example, the Bodhisattva is described as 
trying out two different ascetic paths: in a penance grove, and as pupil of Arå∂a Kålåma 
respectively. The former path leads to heaven. The Bodhisattva rejects it because he 
does not want heaven, but freedom from rebirth (Buddhacarita 7.48). This path is 
described as prav®tti. The path of Arå∂a, which aims at liberation from rebirth, is 
niv®tti.14 
 The story of king Påˆ∂u in the Mahåbhårata (1.110) is equally explicit. When 
Påˆ∂u decides to leave the world, two altogether different possibilities are open to him: 
either he becomes a shaven ascetic, bent on release (mok∑a), or he withdraws to the 
forest, striving for heaven. 
 I will not multiply examples of this kind, as I have published a small book 
dedicated to this and related questions.15 One thing seems however clear. Indians of the 
early post-Vedic period distinguished between two very different ascetic paths, with 
very different aims. One of these two — the one striving after heaven — is explicitly 
linked to the Vedic tradition. These ascetics normally keep the Vedic fire going, even in 
their huts in the forest. The other ascetics — those who look for the end of rebirth — do 
not, at least not in the earliest relevant texts, have anything to do with the Vedic 
sacrificial tradition. 
[42] 
 Recall now that the ideas underlying the search for liberation from rebirth, i.e., 
the belief in rebirth, are a few times introduced in the Upani∑ads in a most remarkable 
manner. Several passages state in so many words that this knowledge (i.e., the 
knowledge of the doctrine of karma, or of the true nature of the self) had not so far been 
known to the Brahmins.16 They admit that the Brahmins have borrowed this knowledge 
from others. I find this highly significant, and I believe that it is obligatory upon us to 
take such passages very seriously. By the time Vedic texts themselves admit that they 
have borrowed certain ideas from others, we had better believe them. This does not 
necessarily mean that we have to also believe that these ideas were borrowed from 
K∑atriyas. This part of the story is so easy to explain (should Brahmins admit to 
borrowing ideas from Vaißyas, or ÍËdras?), that we can take it with a grain of salt. But 
borrow they did, and that is the main thing.17 
                                                
14 Bronkhorst, 1993: 73 f. 
15 The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism, Bern: Peter Lang, 1993. An amusing story from the 
MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya — translated in Strong, 1992: 44-45 — may here be referred. A monkey first 
befriends a group of (Buddhist) pratyekabuddhas, whom it imitates. Subsequently it befriends a group of 
Brahmanical ascetics, in whose presence it still imitates the pratyekabuddhas. As a result the Brahmins 
abandon their own ascetic postures, imitate the monkey, and reach (Buddhist) enlightenment. 
16 Bronkhorst, 1993: 55 f. 
17 H.W. Bodewitz studies the possibility of outside influence on the Vedic ritualistic tradition in some 
recent publications (1992, 1993, 1996, 1996a). Gananath Obeyesekere (1996: 6) considers the strategy to 
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 All this almost forces us to conclude that there existed, besides the Vedic 
Brahmins and those who followed their example and views, other groups of people in 
the period preceding our era, which had ideas and ideals that were significantly 
different from those connected with the Vedic tradition.18 These non-Vedic ideas and 
ideals were apparently more or less irresistible, for they found their way into late Vedic 
literature, as we have seen, and soon became basic to practically all the religious 
developments in India. These ideas and ideals belonged, at least originally, to people 
who were non-Vedic. Were they non-Aryan? I wouldn't know how to answer this 
question. Judging by the way in which the early Buddhists and the Jainas use the term 
årya (pa. ariya, amg. åriya), it seems clear that ‘Aryan’ and ‘non-Aryan’ had almost 
completely lost their original senses at this time.19 But whatever the way these non-
Vedic people referred to themselves, it is not inconceivable, though far from certain, 
that they continued traditions of people that were [43] once considered non-Aryan.20 It 
seems certain that they cannot have been mere marginal inhabitants of the lands of the 
Vedic Indians. The enormous influence their ideas and ideals have exerted suggests 
rather that they constituted a far from negligible portion of the population. 
 
 At this point I would like to draw attention to some recent work done by 
Kenneth G. Zysk on early Indian medicine (1988, 1990, 1991). Óyurveda, Zysk argues, 
does not have its roots in Vedic medical practices.21 Quite on the contrary, for 
information about the early history of Óyurveda one has to look elsewhere, in the early 
surviving texts of the Íramaˆa tradition.22 Zysk concentrates on the text of the Påli 
Tipi†aka, and finds there many striking parallels to classical Óyurvedic literature. 
                                                                                                                                         
try to show incipient notions of karma in the early Vedic traditions and to accept a single line of 
development "methodologically flawed" because it assumes that the extant texts reflected the multiplicity 
of the religious traditions in early India, which is palpably not the case. 
18 This is not to deny that there may have been real "inner conflicts", even within single individuals 
belonging to one single tradition. One could think here of the "major tension" which Stephanie W. 
Jamison "surmises" to be present in ancient Indian ideology, and which she describes as follows (1996: 
16): "On the one hand, as is well known, a man must have sons (and his sons must have sons) in order to 
ensure not only the continuity of the line, but his own continuance in heaven, as is maintained after death 
by the ancestor (pit®) worship performed by his own male line. On the other hand, the idealization of 
asceticism so characteristic of later Hinduism is present, in one form or another, from the earliest period, 
and one of the most powerful forms of ascetic practice is the control of sexuality, the retention of semen. 
So males are confronted with a conundrum: they do not want sex but they need its products." 
19 For a discussion of the meaning of ‘Aryan’ in early Jainism, see Deshpande, 1993: 9 ff. 
20 Olivelle (1993: 68 f.) rightly criticizes some authors who too easily jumped to conclusions regarding 
the supposedly non-Aryan origin of Indian asceticism. 
21 So already Zysk, 1985: 1, 10-11. Cp. Wujastyk, 1995: 20 f. 
22 It is not impossible, but far from certain, that the term ßramaˆa did not originally refer to an 
identifiable class of people, as is maintained by Olivelle (1993: 16); the Vedic evidence in support of this 
is however meagre and perhaps of doubtful value. The term soon came to refer to identifiable groups of 
ascetics, as is clear from various passages, among them the ones to be considered below. 
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 Zysk tries to explain these facts with the help of a hypothesis that is reminiscent 
of the views of Dumont, which we discussed earlier. Medical specialists, he points out, 
were avoided in the Vedic age. This, he continues, pushed them into the direction of the 
Íramaˆas. As he puts it himself (1991: 26): "The shunned medical specialists — 
wandering the countryside, administering cures to all who required (and could pay for) 
them, and closely studying the world around them while exchanging valuable 
information with their fellow healers — understandably gravitated toward those sharing 
a similar alienation and outlook: the orthodox mendicants and the heterodox wandering 
ascetics who had abandoned society to seek liberation from the endless cycle of birth, 
death, and rebirth, and who were quite indifferent or even antagonistic to the bråhmaˆic 
orthodoxy of class and ritualism based on sacrifice to gods of the Vedic pantheon." And 
again (p. 37): "The healers, like the ascetics, were seekers of knowledge and outcastes, 
shunned by the orthodox Hindus. They wandered about, performing their cures and 
acquiring new medicine, treatments, and medical knowledge, and eventually become 
indistinguishable from the other ßramaˆas with whom they were in close contact." He 
then adds: "The healers were not not necessarily ascetics, but many ascetics — for 
instance, the Buddhist monk-healers — might well have been physicians." 
 The development of medicine of which we find evidence in the Buddhist texts is 
therefore, in Zysk's opinion, something of a revolution. He cites in this connection the 
name of Thomas Kuhn, and speaks of a paradigm shift. To cite his own words (p. 26): 
"During the centuries intervening between Vedic medicine and the absorption of Indian 
medicine into bråhmaˆic orthodoxy (ca. eighth century B.C.E. to early centuries C.E.), 
the medical [44] paradigm dramatically shifted from a magico-religious to an empirico-
rational approach to healing." Ascetic traditions, he further maintains (p. 20), played a 
crucial role in facilitating this transition. It occurred "largely because of close 
associations between medicine and the heterodox ascetic traditions of ancient India" (p. 
26). 
 It is true that Zysk does not refer to the work of Louis Dumont. It is however 
hard to deny that he makes a very similar point. It is the ascetics that made the 
intellectual revolution possible which supposedly took place in Indian medicine during 
the late-Vedic period. And the suggestion is that both the healers and the ascetics 
originally belonged to the same, more or less Vedic, society. Their break with that 
society, we are given to understand, was due to the fact that both the ascetics and the 
healers chose a way of life that was in some way opposed to Vedic society. 
 As in the case of the theories of Dumont, we have to ask here too the question 
whether the ascetics concerned were linked to the new medical ideas because they were 
ascetics, or because they came from a social background where such ideas held sway. In 
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the first case we have to assume that both the healers and the ascetics broke away from 
Vedic society; in the second case they didn't have to, because they did not really belong 
to it. In both cases we should expect the heterodox ascetics to be acquainted with the 
non-Vedic forms of medicine. If the healers had broken away from Vedic society, these 
non-Vedic forms of medicine must be looked upon as new, and revolutionary. If not, we 
must consider the possibility that these non-Vedic forms of medicine were not 
necessarily new, and may have been around for a while, but then of course in what I 
will call the non-Vedic segments of society. How can we, on the basis of the available 
evidence, choose between these two possibilities? 
 The fact that there were both Vedic and non-Vedic ascetics may allow us to 
reach a solution. The Vedic ascetics, we might expect, were somehow linked to Vedic 
forms of medicine; the non-Vedic ascetics to the non-Vedic forms of medicine. Is there 
a way to test this hypothesis? 
 There is, and Zysk provides us with the evidence. He refers to two Greek 
passages preserved by the historian and geographer Strabo. The first one is a well-
known account by Megasthenes, who was sent around 300 B.C.E. as an ambassador by 
the first Seleucus to the court of Candragupta Maurya at På†aliputra. This account 
describes one kind of Brahmanical ascetic, and two kinds of Íramaˆas. In an earlier 
publication I have been able to show that these altogether three kinds of ascetics agree 
in many details with a similar division found in the Ópastamba Dharma SËtra.23 The 
second kind of Íramaˆa, in particular, is described as surviving by begging, and as 
remaining motionless for long periods of time. Interestingly, this second kind of 
Íramaˆa are here called ‘physicians’ (Áatrikoí). The passage further specifies (I use 
Zysk's translation, p. 28): "and [he says that] they are able to bring about multiple 
offspring, male offspring and female offspring, through [45] the art of preparing and 
using drugs; but they accomplish healing through grains for the most part, not through 
drugs; and of the drugs [he says that] the most highly esteemed are the ointments and 
the plasters". 
 Zysk's comments on this passage are worth quoting (p. 28-29): "The ßramaˆic 
healers are said to effect their cures mostly through grain foods (sitía), and when they 
employ drugs (fármaka), the most esteemed are ointments (\píxrista) and poultices 
(kataplásmata). Inherent in this distinction is the internal dietary use of foods and the 
external application of drugs, both of which are fundamental to the rational therapy 
(yuktivyapåßraya) of åyurvedic medicine. The former helps to sustain and regulate the 
internal functions of the human organism by restoring a balance to the bodily elements, 
while the latter eradicates afflictions located on the body's surface. Medical passages 
                                                
23 Bronkhorst, 1993: ch. 1. 
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contained both in the Buddhist monastic code (Vinaya) and in the early åyurvedic 
treatises are replete with illustrations of the medicinal use of foods and the therapeutic 
application of remedies such as ointments and poultices." 
 Zysk is also no doubt right when he states (p. 28): "The passage clearly points to 
a connection between the physicians ... and the ßramaˆas ..., recognizing the former as a 
subgroup of the latter." One may have doubts as to whether healers in the time of 
Megasthenes were really a subgroups of the Íramaˆas, and whether they really all 
survived by begging, and remained motionless for long periods of time. Perhaps 
Megasthenes' testimony is not reliable in all these details. It must however be admitted 
that these kinds of healers are here said to be connected (in one way or another) with the 
Íramaˆas. 
 More interesting for our present purposes is another passage from Strabo's 
Geography (15.1.70), also referred to by Zysk. Zysk offers the following translation:24 
 
In classifying philosophers, [the writers on India] set the Pramnai (i.e., 
ßramaˆas) in opposition to the Brachmanes (i.e., Bråhmaˆs). [The Pramnai] are 
captious and fond of cross-questioning; and [they say that] the Brachmanes 
practice natural philosophy and astronomy, but they are derided by the Pramnai 
as charlatans and fools. And [they say that] some are called mountain dwelling, 
others naked, and others urban and neighbouring, and [the] mountain-dwelling 
[Pramnai] use (i.e., wear) hides of deer and have leather pouches, full of roots 
and drugs, claiming to practice medicine with sorcery, spells, and amulets. 
 
This passage causes Zysk some problems. He comments (p. 32): "The mountain-
dwelling Pramnai in this passage differ from the [46] ßramaˆa-physicians described by 
Megasthenes. The healing of the Pramnai ß[r]amaˆas is magico-religious, using sorcery, 
spells, and amulets, and reminiscent of the early Vedic medical tradition reflected in the 
Atharvaveda. This form of healing is, on the whole, contrary to the empirical and 
rational medicine of the early Buddhist and åyurvedic literature, in which references to 
magical techniques are rare." This goes, of course, against Zysk's general thesis, 
according to which the Íramaˆas are to be connected with a new kind of medicine, not 
with the old Vedic one. 
 The problem can however easily be solved. Nothing in the original Greek says 
that the Íramaˆas practise medicine with sorcery, spells, and amulets.25 The agent of 
the last sentence of this passage is not specified, and there is no compelling reason to 
                                                
24 Zysk, 1991: 32; cp. McCrindle, 1901: 76; Jones, 1930: 122-125. For the original Greek, see Jones, 
1930: 122-124; Meineke, 1877: 1001). 
25 I thank my doctoral student Bogdan Diaconescu for helping me with the interpretation of this passage. 
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think that it concerns Íramaˆas rather than philosophers in general, or even only 
Brahmins. Indeed, there are some rather clear indications to show that the Brahmins are 
decidedly not excluded in the latter half of this passage. The mountain-dwellers here 
discussed are said to wear hides of deer. Deer skins are exactly what, according to 
Megasthenes, Brahmins use. We may assume that our Greek authors here refer to the 
antelope-skin, which is a special feature of Vedic ascetics.26  
 The immediately following sentences, not quoted by Zysk, confirm that 
Brahmins are not excluded in this passage. Indeed, one gets the impression that specific 
features of certain groups are to some extent confused; some of these features, at any 
rate, are typically Brahmanical. We read, for example, in connection with the naked 
[philosophers]:27 "Women live in their society without sexual commerce." This is 
typical for the Vedic vånaprastha, who withdraws with his wife into the forest. The 
Vedic vånaprastha needs a wife in order to fulfil his sacrificial obligations. About the 
so-called ‘urban’ [philosophers] we read (15.1.71) that some live "out in the country, 
and go clad in the skins of fawns or antelopes".28 Again the antelope skin, a 
Brahmanical feature which we discussed above. If, moreover, the statement to the effect 
"that they all wear long hair and long beards, and that they braid their hair and surround 
it with a head-band"29 refers to the same ‘urban’ philosophers, we have here another 
feature referring to Brahmins rather than to the Íramaˆas, who had a tendency to be 
bald. 
[47] 
 The second passage from Strabo's Geography suggests, therefore, that also 
Brahmanical ascetics were known to offer their services as healers, but that they, 
contrary to the non-Vedic ascetics, practised a different kind of healing, the kind of 
healing namely, which we also find in Vedic texts. 
 We may, in view of the above, agree with Zysk that some, perhaps many, 
ascetics in ancient India also worked as healers. But there is no reason to think that the 
association of healers with ascetics was responsible for the "paradigm shift" which 
supposedly took place at that time. The evidence we have is limited, but it suggests 
something quite different. It suggests that Vedic ascetics practised Vedic healing, and 
that non-Vedic ascetics practised non-Vedic healing. This, in its turn, only makes sense 
on the assumption that the social background of the healers concerned determined the 
                                                
26 Bronkhorst, 1993: 51 with n. 12. 
27 Tr. McCrindle, 1901: 76. Cp. Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001. 
28 Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001. 
29  Geography 15.1.71 (Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1002; tr. Jones.) McCrindle (1901: 77) 
translates this passage in a manner which suggests that all Indians wear long hair and long beards. 
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type of healing they would practise.30 And this suggests that there were two traditions of 
healing which existed side by side, in different segments of society. 
 Let me not fail to point out here that Zysk does not reject the possibility of 
different traditions existing side by side. He reminds us on p. 24 that the frequent travels 
of Vedic healers beyond the frontiers of Aryan society in order to acquire the rich 
pharmacopoeia mentioned in the Atharvaveda brought them into frequent contact with 
non-Aryan peoples. They obtained from these outsiders, Zysk continues, much new and 
valuable knowledge pertainingto their special craft. "Their contact with non-Óryans 
might well have given rise to an empirical orientation that became ... antagonistic to 
bråhmaˆic orthodoxy in the later Vedic period." (p. 24). Zysk does not however 
elaborate this theme of the presence of an empirical orientation outside what he calls 
Aryan society. 
 How were these two traditions distinct from each other? Zysk characterizes the 
Vedic tradition of healing as "magico-religious", the non-Vedic tradition as "empirico-
rational".31 "Vedic medicine," he points out on p. 15, "was fundamentally a system of 
healing based on magic. Disease was believed to be produced by demonic or 
malevolent forces when they attacked and entered the bodies of their victims, causing 
the manifestation of morbid bodily conditions. These assaults were occasioned by the 
breach of certain taboos, by imprecations against the gods, or by witchcraft and 
sorcery."32 [48] With regard to the non-Vedic tradition of medicine Zysk has the 
following to say (p. 29-30): "Indian medical theoreticians placed paramount emphasis 
on direct observation as the proper means to know everything about mankind. ... 
Complete knowledge of humans and their relationship to their environment included an 
understanding of the causes of mankind's ailments. Indian medicine's inherent 
philosophical orientation led to theories about causes for mankind's afflictions. 
Although its exact origin cannot be determined, the etiology particular to Indian 
medicine is the three-humor (trido∑a) theory. Nearly all the maladies plaguing humans 
are explained by means of three ‘peccant’ humors, or do∑as — wind, bile, and phlegm 
— either singly or in combination. The do∑as are really specific waste products of 
                                                
30 Wolz-Gottwald (1990) draws attention to features of classical Óyurveda that are hard to reconcile with 
both a Brahmanical and an ascetic origin; the empirico-rational approach may therefore have originated 
in more world-oriented circles. This, of course, supports our argument. 
31 Wezler (1995: 222) looks upon the stark contrast between the ‘magico-religious healing’ of the Veda 
and the later ‘empirico-rational medecine’ as "acceptable as rhetorical exaggeration". After severe 
criticism of a number of passages in Zysk's book, Wezler comes none the less to the conclusion that 
"[i]ronically Zysk may nevertheless ultimately be right" (p. 228). 
32 Cp. Zysk, 1985: 8: "In this work ... the concept of magico-religious medicine is understood to be as 
follows: Causes of diseases are not attributed to physiological functions, but rather to external beings or 
forces of a demonic nature who enter the body of their victim and produce sickness. The removal of such 
malevolent entities usually involved an elaborate ritual, often drawing on aspects of the dominant local 
religion and nearly always necessitating spiritually potent and efficacious words, actions and devices." 
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digested food, occurring in quantities greater or lesser than need to maintain normal 
health. They act as vitiators by disrupting the normal balance of the bodily elements 
(dhåtus), which in turn are modifications of the five basic elements (earth, air, fire, 
water, and ether) found in all of nature, and the resulting disequilibrium of the bodily 
elements produce disease. Their empirical orientation also led the medical theoreticians 
to include environmental factors, daily regimen, and external factors in their overall 
consideration of the causes of diseases."33 
 These observations about the early history of Indian medicine seem to confirm 
our impression that there existed, in the late-Vedic period, (at least) two segments of 
society which independently preserved rather radically different traditions and 
approaches to reality. In this connection I would like to cite the words of an 
archaeologist. George Erdosy, in an article called "The archaeology of early 
Buddhism", arrives at the following conclusion (1993: 46): 
 
[I]t would be a great mistake to derive classical Indian civilisation solely from 
its Vedic antecedents. Such an approach may be criticised on two counts: to 
begin with, recent surveys of the "Aryan" problem ... suggest that far from being 
an invading race, the Óryas of the Rigveda were a locally emerging ethnic group 
of northwestern India, distinguished by a set of social and religious institutions. 
Secondly, ... many regions of northern India, previously thought to have been 
colonised only by the Aryans of the first millennium BC, had in fact been 
populated for at least 1000 years previously, and reveal a gradual progress of 
civilisation which need not assume anything so drastic as foreign invasions. The 
"Aryanisation" of the Indian Subcontinent, therefore, is best seen as the selective 
adoption of an attractive ideology — first associated with an ethnic group of 
northwestern India that called itself Órya — by local elites, who strove to justify 
expanding and increasingly inegalitarian social systems, whose presence in the 
archaeological record we have just traced through the emergence of settlement 
hierarchies. 
[49] 
Archaeology therefore seems to provide some measure of support for the position I 
have presented. 
 The same author warns, in another publication (Erdosy, 1995: 3), against 
confusing "Aryans" with "Indo-Aryans". The first term — he explains — is based on 
                                                
33 Filliozat (1949: 157 f.) mentions the presence of the theory of breaths/winds in the Upani∑ads as proof 
for the continuity of Vedic medicine and classical Óyurveda. However, the same evidence might be 
interpreted as resulting from non-Vedic influence, as in the case of the belief in rebirth. Various 
afflictions of wind mentioned in the Påli canon are discussed in Zysk, 1991: 92 f. 
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the self-designation of the Vedic poets and denotes a multitude of ethnic groups 
subscribing to a newly emerging ideology, whereas the second term identifies speakers 
of a subgroup of languages within the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. 
The implication is, of course, that there may have been Indo-Aryans who were not 
Aryans. 
 Let us return to Zysk. I do not know to what extent his use of the expression 
"empirico-rational" is appropriate with regard to the non-Vedic traditions we have been 
considering. It does however raise the question whether the roots of Indian philosophy 
are to be looked for in the opposition between Vedic and non-Vedic traditions.34 
 Here we have to turn to Erich Frauwallner. Frauwallner believed that the 
development of Indian philosophy is to be explained with the help of a basic opposition. 
In the pre-war years he maintained that this opposition was a racial one: the Aryan 
invaders dominated the first, purely philosophical period, whereas the second, theistic 
and dogmatic period betrayed the increased influence of the original non-Aryans.35 In 
later years he changed his views,36 without however abandoning the idea that a basic 
opposition was at work in the history of Indian philosophy. He now believed that two 
currents of thought were at work. One of these had originated in the early Upani∑ads 
and is at the basis of early Upani∑adic philosophy; it is characterized by the doctrine of 
a ‘world-soul’, Brahma. This current later gave rise to Såµkhya and Buddhism, 
according to Frauwallner (1953: [50] 192f., 268). The other current is characterized by 
the acceptance of a multitude of individual souls, and by a strong natural philosophical 
orientation (Frauwallner, 1953: 268). It is this current which gave rise to the natural 
philosophy underlying classical Vaiße∑ika. These two currents later influenced each 
other to the extent that the original scientific spirit of the second current got lost, and 
ideas about God and liberation entered into it. 
 Frauwallner has correctly been criticized for his overall vision of the 
development of Indian philosophy. His idea of a period of strong natural philosophical 
                                                
34 Ruben (1979: 37), after referring to physiological thought, concludes: "So lässt sich schon andeuten, 
dass es neben der uns literarisch einzig erhaltenen Theologie dieser Zeiten noch Wissen und anderes 
Glauben gab, aus dem sich Philosophie entwickeln konnte." He does not introduce the notion of two 
opposing traditions, but observes on p. 40, "dass im Grund nur die Medizin und die Staatslehre sich 
später von der Theologie weitgehend lösen konnten". 
35 Frauwallner, 1938; 1939. de Jong (1997: 171) draws attention to a conference contribution by 
Frauwallner published in 1944, in which he quotes with approval W. v. Soden's words "dass 
Wissenschaft im strengen Sinn des Wortes etwas ist, das nur von den durch die nordische Rasse 
bestimmten Indogermanen geschaffen werden konnte". 
36 Oberhammer, 1976: 9-10; cp. Houben, 1995: 713 f. Walter Ruben maintained still in 1979 that 
philosophy in India was due to the Aryans: "Erst mit den Óryas begann Philosophie in Indien, etwa sechs 
Jahrhunderte nach ihrer Einwanderung, noch nicht, solange sie ihr Nomadisieren im Panjab und 
Gangesgebiet fortsetzten ..., sonder erst, als sie dort allmählich sesshaft geworden waren." (Ruben, 1979: 
13); cp. p. 15-16: "Vorbedingungen des Beginns der indischen und griechischen Philosophie waren 
schliesslich die beiden ... Völker. Kurz, man muss von der sich allseitig entwickelnden 
Menschheitsgeschichte und dem Platz der alten Inder und Griechen in ihr ausgehen, will mann verstehen, 
warum gerade bei ihnen ungefähr gleichzeitig Philosophie begann." 
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orientation in early Vaiße∑ika, for example, does not appear to stand the test of 
historical research. The earliest form of this philosophy reachable to us has already a 
number of features that do not fit in well with Frauwallner's natural philosophical 
orientation, such as yogic perception, and an omnipresent soul.37 Moreover, there are 
reasons to think that this school of thought arose under the influence of, and in 
opposition to, certain developments within Buddhism.38 Seen in this way, Vaiße∑ika 
continues right from the beginning the rationalistic tendency which makes its 
appearance in Buddhist scholastic literature, without abandoning the search for 
liberation which would seem to be central to it. Såµkhya has not been so profoundly 
touched by this rationalistic virus, but Såµkhya, too, is centred on the quest for 
liberation. Såµkhya and Yoga have always constituted a natural pair, even though these 
terms meant something different in the Mahåbhårata than in the period of the 
philosophical systems. 
 Seen in this light, all important schools of Indian philosophy have one common 
origin. They all derive, ultimately, from those parts of the population where karma and 
rebirth held sway, i.e., from the non-Vedic population. We have already seen that even 
the Upani∑adic passages that show acquaintance with these ideas appear to have been 
influenced by these same non-Vedic portions of the population. This does not mean that 
the history of Indian philosophy is free from oppositions. There is, for example, the 
ongoing battle between Buddhism and the schools of thought that came to be looked 
upon as Brahmanical. More important for our present purposes is the incorporation of 
currents such as Såµkhya into the Brahmanical fold. The opposition between these two 
has left a number of traces in early literature.39 [51] I can only mention here the passage 
in the Mahåbhårata (12.260-262) which records a discussion between Kapila, the 
supernatural "founder" of Såµkhya, and the Vedic ®∑i SyËmaraßmi. SyËmaraßmi rejects 
                                                
37 Isaacson, 1993; Bronkhorst, 1993a: 87 f.; 1993b; Houben, 1995. Cp. also Miyamoto, 1996: 19-33 
("Dimension of soul"). 
38 Bronkhorst, 1992. 
39 Not only in early literature. The Tattvasamåsa, for example, refers — according to the commentary 
Sarvopakåriˆ¥ — to "bondage by sacrificial gift" (dåk∑iˆa bandha); Keith (1924: 103) comments: "This 
curious form of bondage arises when men through misconception give gifts to the priests, and is a distinct 
sign of hostility to the sacrifice, which is not seen in the Kårikå". And GuˆaratnasËri's 
Tarkarahasyad¥pikå on Haribhadra's ›a∂darßanasamuccaya (14th cent.) says the following about the 
Såµkhyas (Mahendra Kumar Jain, 1969: 141): "They are numerous in Våråˆas¥. Many Brahmins, fasting 
for a month, follow the way of smoke which is opposed to the way of light. But the Såµkhyas follow the 
way of light. For that very reason the Brahmins, to whom the Veda is dear, follow the way of sacrifice. 
The Såµkhyas, on the other hand, turning away from the Veda which is rich in violence, proclaim the 
self." (våråˆasyåµ te∑åµ pråcuryam/ bahavo måsopavåsikå bråhmaˆå 
arcirmårgaviruddhadhËmamårgånugåmina˙/ såµkhyås tv arcirmårgånugå˙/ tata eva bråhmaˆå vedapriyå 
yajñamårgånugå˙/ såµkhyås tu hiµså∂hyavedaviratå adhyåtmavådina˙/) 
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the possibility of liberation and exhorts to action; Kapila preaches liberation through 
restraint and abstention from activity.40 
 Note that in the discussion of the development of Indian philosophy it becomes 
more and more difficult to assign the different positions to different segments of the 
population. In this period ideas begin to cross over from one segment of the population 
to another. Even if certain Upani∑adic passages appear to have been influenced by non-
Vedic ideas, they remain Vedic texts, belonging primarily to Vedic Brahmins. And if, 
as I think is the case, Vaiße∑ika originated under the influence of certain developments 
within Buddhism, this school of thought yet appears to have been Brahmanical from the 
beginning.41 In other words, lines of descent are less and less limited to single segments 
of the population. 
 Yet it appears that during the late-Vedic period such a division still did exist in 
Indian society. This division appears to be behind the fundamental [52] oppositions that 
make themselves felt in the early texts of the Íramaˆic religions, in the late-Vedic texts, 
and to some extent in the Mahåbhårata. This division may continue an opposition that at 
one time opposed Aryans and non-Aryans. How to decide whether this is actually the 
case, I do not know.42 
 
 To conclude, I would like to cite a short passage from a recent article by G. 
Fussman (1989: 529): 
                                                
40 Compare the discussion on "Kapila, Såµkhya, and the Óßramas" in Olivelle, 1993: 98-99. 
Surprisingly, Wilhelm Halbfass expresses the following opinion with regard to Såµkhya (1995: 85): 
"Historisch gesehen dürfen wir wohl davon ausgehen, dass die Lehre vom Karma gar nicht Teil des 
ältesten Såµkhya war und erst nachträglich im Laufe späterer Entwicklungen eingeführt wurde; dies 
geschah dann zuweilen in der Form, dass es als Auslöser für das Strömen und scheinbar bewusste 
Agieren der Urmaterie (prak®ti) ausgelegt wurde. Voll integriert wurde das Karma, was das klassische 
Såµkhya betrifft, freilich nicht; das war wohl auch angesichts der Tatsache, dass es sich hier um eine in 
fundamentalem Sinne auf Transzendenz und Quietismus ausgerichtete Weise des Denkens handelt, nicht 
zu erwarten. Im Yoga ist die Rolle des Karma allerdings — möglicherweise unter buddhistischem 
Einfluss — relevanter und erheblich deutlicher ausgeprägt." This statement is utterly surprising, and not 
based on any textual evidence that I know of. Most probably Halbfass is here a victim of the linear 
approach to Indian intellectual history, which assumes that all post-Vedic developments must somehow 
derive from Vedic thought and religion. 
41 Here one could draw attention to the ‘proof’ in the Vaiße∑ika SËtra of the existence of seers (®∑i) 
responsible for the composition of the Veda (VS 6.1.1-2, ed. Jambuvijaya; Wezler, 1985), as well as to 
the occurrence, still in Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha, of Vedic cosmographical concepts 
(varuˆaloka ‘the world of Varuˆa’, ådityaloka ‘the world of Óditya’, marutåµ loka ‘the world of the 
Maruts’; see WI under these expressions). These or related terms occur in the Vedic Bråhmaˆas (see 
Kirfel, 1920: 5-6), a few times in the Mahåbhårata (Sörensen, 1904: s.v. Varuˆaloka, Våyuloka), but 
apparently only rarely, some of them perhaps not at all, in the later Puråˆic literature. The 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha does use Puråˆic, i.e. non-Vedic, material in the context of God's creation of the 
world, but this appears to be new material brought into the school by Praßastapåda himself (Bronkhorst, 
1996). 
42 If one accepts, with Sergent (1997: 355 ff.), that the similarities between Greek medicine and 
Óyurveda must be explained by assuming that they both go back to Indo-European roots, one is almost 
obliged to think that the non-Vedic traditions identified in this paper have Aryan roots. However, these 
similarities are explained by others as due to early contacts between the two cultures; so Filliozat, 1949: 
161 ff.; Zimmermann, 1989: 177 ff. 




... l'on peut légitimement se demander ce que les Óryas ont apporté à l'Inde, 
outre leur langue. 
 Leur apport est certain en matière de religion, même si le RV ne rend pas 
compte de l'ensemble de l'idéologie Órya aux moments de l'entrée des Óryas en 
Inde: l'unification cultuelle, si elle a jamais été réalisée, est un phénomène 
beaucoup plus tardif (constitution de la saµhitå et plus encore Bråhmaˆas). Ceci 
dit, autant qu'on puisse en juger, les cultes védiques doivent peu à l'Inde pré-
aryenne: aucun des emprunts supposés n'est prouvable, et beaucoup sont plus 
que douteux (par exemple, le proto-Íiva des sceaux de l'Indus, D. Meth-
Srinivasan). Les réels bouleversements que l'on constate (généralisation de 
l'incinération, par exemple) et qui semblent s'être produits en Inde même ne 
semblent pas explicables en termes de substrat. 
 
If the opposition between Vedic and non-Vedic which I have discussed continues an old 
opposition between Aryan and non-Aryan, then the non-Aryan element in post-Vedic 
developments becomes very visible indeed. This, however, is far from certain, as I have 
already repeatedly emphasized. Less uncertain is, I submit, that real and fundamental 
differences existed at the late-Vedic period between at least two, perhaps more, 
segments of the population. The nature of these differences justifies, as it seems to me, 
some other conclusion, which may or may not have anything to do with Aryans and 
non-Aryans. The magical, or magico-religious, nature of Vedic thought, as it expresses 
itself primarily in the Bråhmaˆas and Upani∑ads, has often been commented upon. One 
might be tempted to think that this way of thinking is characteristic of early human 
societies, that we find it in the Veda because the Veda is very old. The evidence 
discussed in this paper suggests something different. It suggests that, at least in late-
Vedic times, there were other segments of society where this kind of thought was not at 
all prevalent. The so-called magical, or magico-religious, way of thinking of the Vedic 
segments of society may therefore have been consciously cultivated, not because people 
didn't know how to think otherwise, but because they believed that only this way of 
thinking enabled them to enter into contact with the true nature of things, with 
mythological reality which is hidden behind ordinary reality. The late-Vedic Indians, 
seen this way, were in contact with others who did not think like them. They 
distinguished themselves from those others [53] by hanging on to their own ways of 
magical thinking. The question whether this way of thinking is one of the contributions 
of the Aryans to India may have to remain unanswered. 
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